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Introduction

Not since Andrew Johnson was impeached in 1868 has pres

idential impeachment been seriously considered.

But in 197^. our

country, for the second time in it's history, faced the possibility
that our President may, in the words of the Constitution, "be re
moved from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,

Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

It was this

great, but unfortunate event in our history, that prompted me to
write this thesis.

•Impeachment, is potentially the most powerful weapon in

the Congressional arsenal, and for this reason the least used.

As

strange as it may seem the exact meaning of this weapon was never

clearly spelled out by the Fraraers of our Constitution- and, in the
intervening years between the Johnson impeachment and now, very
little has been written on the subject of impeachable offenses
relative to the President.

I believe the Framers of our Constitu

tion had a certain practice in mind when they adopted the impeach

ment clause, and by the time the reader is done with this paper he
should be convinced that the conclusions I have drawn are reasonable

and logical ones.

In this thesis I am. going to deal only with impeachable

offenses as they relate to the President.

There are basically

^Committee On Federal Legislation, The Law of Presidential
Impeachment. (New York:

Harper & Row, 197^Ti P^ 3.
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two reasons for this.

First of all, and most importantly, I

have approached the problem of impeachable offenses in much the
same way as they were in the Constitutional Convention, and that
is, in direct relation to the President.

Although the discussion

of impeachment in the Constitutional Convention was rather short
it dealt almost exclusively with the President,

And second, there

is much debate on whether or not the "good behavior" clause of
Article III, section 1, in the Constitution adds a new dimension

to the impeachment clause as it concerns the removal of judges.
It is for these reasons that I will limit my discussion of impeach

able offenses to the President..

What I shall endeavor to prove is

that an impeachable offense for a President can be, but, does not
have to be, criminal or indictable.

The subject of impeachment and conviction is dealt with
by the Constitution in six places.

Following are the six pro

visions in their chronological order:

Article I, Section 2 states:

The House of Representatives . . . shall have the

sole power of impeachment.2 •
Article I, Section 3 states:
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all Im

peachments.

When sitting for that Purpose, they shall

be on Oath or Affirmation.

When the President of the

United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence

of two-thirds of the Members present.

Judgement in Cases

of Impeachment shall not extend

further than to removal from Office,

and disqualification

to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit
2

Alpheus T. Mason, & William M. Beaney, American Con

stitutional Law, (5th ed; New Jersey:
p. 668.

.

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972),

under the United States:
but the Party convicted
shall nevetheless be liable and suject to Indict

ment. Trial, Judgement and Punishment, according to

Law. 3
Article II, Section 2 states:
The President . . . shall have Power to grant

Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
Article II, Section ^ states:

The President, Vice President and all civil officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on

Impeachment for, and Conviction of Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.->
Article III, Section 2 states:

The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im

peachment, shall be by Jury , . . °
Most of what has been stated above is clear, except for

the one key provision, that of Article II, Section 4, dealing
with the grounds for impeachment, but I assert that it does have
a semi-defined meaning and to find that meaning one must turn to
history.

Impeachment is an English invention and therefore any dis
cussion of it should begin there.

In this thesis I begin by giving

a brief history of impeachment in England.

The brief historical

analysis includes the origin of impeachment, its development, and
a few cases in which it was used.

By viewing impeachment histori

cally it should become apparent to the reader that the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors", as used in England, developed apart from

3lbid.
Ibid., P. 672.

5lbid., p. 673.

6Ibid.. p. 67b.

the ordinary criminal law and included offenses, which in some cases,
were not criminal.

The debates in the Constitutional Convention and other con

temporary statements are then taken up and analyzed in the attempt
to discover if impeachment must lie for a crime.

The conclusion I

draw is that impeachable offenses were not limited to crimes by the
Framers of our Constitution.

After the above discussion I will take up the arguments most

often advanced by the constitutional authorities who argue that im

peachment can only lie for a crime.

The first argument asserts that

only those offenses which were indictable at the time our Constitu
tion was adopted are impeachable.

The second argument is a multi-

faceted one, but relies primarily on the language used by the Framers

in speaking of impeachment during their debates in the Constitutional
Convention and the language which appears in the Constitution which
connotes criminality.

My rebuttal follows each argument.

The impeachment of Andrew Johnson is then dealt with rather

briefly and its validity as a proper precedent explored.

This

discussion is followed up by my conclusion.

It has been accepted by nearly everyone that has ever

written on the subject of impeachment that our impeachment practice
was modelled after that of England's, subject to the modifications

applied to it by the Constitution.

Thus in my attempt to prove that

impeachment can lie for less than a crime I start with a discussion
of impeachment as that process operated in England.
Before I take up the English practice it is necessary to

define the-terra crime so the reader will know or understand what I
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mean when I say that impeachment can lie for less than a crime.
The definition that appears here is taken almost word for word from
the fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary.

There crime is defined

as a positive or negative act in violation of penal law or statute,
and the dictionary goes on to state that "crime" and "misdemeanor"
are, properly speaking, synonymous terms; though in common usage
"crime" is made to denote an offense of a more serious nature.

II.

Impeachment:

7

In England

»

•Impeachment began in the late fourteenth century when the

Commons took it upon themselves to prosecute before the Lords,

the Kings ministers and favorites.

These were men, as the Parlia

ment saw it, who were beyond reach of the ordinary sanctions applied
to the average wrongdoer.

Thus impeachment became a tool by which

the Parliament made an effort to establish a more responsive and

responsible government and to correct imbalances when they occurred.
The term "high crimes and misdemeanors" was first met in
o

the proceedings against the Earl of Suffolk in 1386.

At that

time "there was in fact no such crime as a misdemeanor."9

Ac

cording to Raoul Berger "lesser crimes were prosecuted as tres
passes well into the sixteenth century, and only then were tres

passes supplanted by misdemeanors as a category of ordinary crimes".

Since there was a gap of around 150 years between the time"high

Minn.:

'Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary. (St. Paul,
West Publishing Co.. 1968) , pp. 444-^-5.
°Raoul Berger,. Impeachment:

(Cambridge, Massachusetts:

9IMd. , p. 6l.
10Ibld.n \

The Constitutional Problems.

Harvard University Press, 1973)» p. 59•

tl

crimes and misdemeanors evolved relative to impeachment and mis

demeanor as a category of ordinary crimes a difference in the
meaning of the two is implicit.

To argue otherwise places one in

the position of explaining away the 150 year gap before the term
misdemeanor was incorporated into the ordinary criminal law.

It

will become apparent shortly that the gap of 150 years shows a
functional difference that separates misdemeanors from high misde

meanors.

"High crimes and misdemeanors were a category of polit

ical crimes against the state, whereas misdemeanors described

criminal sanctions for private wrongs".

1 1

x

Berger continues on in

his book to explain that'misdemeanors, although part of the ordinary
criminal law, did not become the criterion of "high misdemeanor" in

the parliamentary law of impeachment.

Nor did the term "high misde

meanor" find its way into the general criminal law of England.

It

is because of this division that people have considered the phrase

"high crimes and misdemeanors" a "term of art" confined to impeach
ment.

As used in England the- term high modified both ^crimes" and
misdemeanors.

Proof of this can be found by referring to the charges

against Chief Justice Scroggs mentioned in the list of English of
ficials impeached in the following pages.

The legal doctrine

eiusdem generis would also require that "high" modify misdemeanor.

That doctrine states that "the meaning of a general word ought to

be limited to the kind or class of things within which the specific

words fall."12 This doctrine applies more specifically in the case
uIbld.
12

Charles- L. Black Jr., Impeachment (New Haven & London:
Yale University Press,197*0, p.36.
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of our Constitution because there treason, bribery and high crimes
are of a serious nature and if misdemeanor is contrasted with those

terms it's meaning must also be of a serious nature following the
above doctrine.

According to Professor Black it would be a misap

plication of the rule to limit misdemeanors to crimes.

The class

or kind of offenses refers not to crimes but to serious offenses.

In the following pages I will list a few of the officials
who were impeached in England for "high crimes and misdemeanors"

and, provide at the same time the list (in some cases a partial
list) of charges against them.

It is in this way that content can

be given to the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors".

Chancellor Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk (1386),
high crimes and misdemeanors:

applied appropriated funds

to purposes other than those specified.

Duke of Suffolk (1^5°)i treason and high crimes and mis
demeanors:
Procured offices for persons who were unfit
and unworthy of them; delayed justice by stopping writs

of appeal (private criminal prosecutions) for the death

of complainants' husbands.^
Lord Treasurer Middlesex (162*0, high crimes and mis
demeanors:
allowed the office of Ordinance to go unre
paired though money was appropriated for that purpose;
allowed contracts for greatly needed powder to lapse for

want of payment.^
Duke of Buckingham (1626), misdemeanors, misprisions,
offenses, and crimes:
though young and inexperienced,
procured offices for himself, thereby blocking the de
serving; neglected as great admiral to safeguard the
seas; procured titles of honor to his mother, brothers,

kindred.lo
Sir Richard Gurney, Lord Mayor of London (l6**2), high

*3Berger, Impeachment, p. 67.

Ifrlbld.

15Ibid.
l6Ibid.
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crimes and misdemeanors:

thwarted Parlimentjs order

to store arms and ammunition in storehouses.

Viscount Mordaunt (1660), high crimes and misdemeanors:

prevented Tayleur from standing for election as a burgess
to serve in Parliament; caused his illegal arrest and de

tention.18

Peter Pett, Commissioner of the Navy (1668), high crimes
and misdemeanors: negligent preparation for the Dutch
invasion: loss of ship through neglect to bring it to

mooring.*9
Chief Justice North (l680), high crimes and misdemeanors:

assisted the Attorney General in drawing a proclamation to

suppress petitions to the king to call a Parliament.^0
Chief Justice Scroggs (1680), treason and high misde
meanors: discharged grand jury before they made their

presentment, thereby obstructing the presentment of many

Papists; arbitrarily granted general warrants in blank.21
Sir Edward Seymour (1680), high crimes and misdemeanors:
applied appropriated funds to public purposes other than

those specified. 2
Duke of Leeds (1695), high crimes and misdemeanors:

as

president of Privy Council accepted 5i500 guineas from
the East India Company to procure a charter of confor

mation. 23

Edward, Earl of Oxford (1701), high crimes and misde
meanors: The Earl ... in concent with other false and
evil counsellors, advised our said soverign lord the

king ... to enter into a one treaty for dividing the

monarchy and dominions of Spain. 4

17Ibid., p. 68.
l8Ibid.
^Ibid.

20Ibid.
2lIbid.
22

^Ibid.
23 Ibid.
7h

Alexander Simpson Jr., A Treatise on Federal Impeach

ments, (Wilmington, Delaware:
pTTS5.

Scholary Resources, Inc., 1973J",

9

What this article amounted to was giving pernicious ad

vice to the Crown.

England was at this time engaged in several

alliances, the intention of which was to prevent the growth of

power of the French King.

The treaty, advised by the Earl and

others, gave large parts of the Spanish dominion to the French,
thereby adding to the power of the French King.

Warren Hastings first Governor-General of India (1786),
high crimes and misdemeanors: "Gross maladministration,
corruption in office, and cruelty towards the people of
India".25
It might be well to .remember that it was the impeachment
of Warren Hastings that was referred to by George Mason in the
debates during the Constitutional Convention.

The charges listed in the impeachment cases above demon
strated that, in England, impeachable offenses need not be criminal
or indictable.

More precisely the term "high crimes and misde

meanors" incorporated those political sorts of offenses that were

contrary to responsible government.
trolling.

Thus criminality was not con

Again, the cases listed above do not constitute a complete

list of those officials impeached in England.

Generally then two points emerge from the English parlia

mentary experience with the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors,"
and both are found or represented by the charges listed above.

In

a broad sense the allegations serve to delineate the outlines of

"high crimes and misdemeanors".
First, the particular allegations of misconduct
alleged damage to the state in such forms as misapplication
2 ^

•'Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry; Committee on the Judi
ciary. House, of Representatives Ninety-third Congress, second session,
Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, (Washington:
U.S. Governnent Printing Office, 197*0, p. 7«
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of funds, abuse of official power, neglect of duty,
encrochment on Parliament's perogatives, corruption,

and betrayal of trust. Second, the phrase "high crimes
and misdemeanors" was confined to parliamentary impeach
ments; it had no roots in the ordinary criminal law,
and the particular allegations of misconduct under that
heading were not neccessarily limited to common law or
statutory derelictions or crimes.20

Even though English officials were impeached for offenses
that amounted to something short of a crime, impeachment pro

ceedings were clearly criminal in nature. Not only were those
officials that were impeached and convicted subject to fines and

imprisonment, but also to execution. Undeniably then, impeach
ment in England was a criminal proceeding.

In summary it appears that impeachable offenses, in England,
were not limited to the criminal law.

The institution of impeach

ment evolved because the officials and in some instances the offenses

they committed were beyond the ordinary means of criminal redress.

The phraseology (ie., high crimes and misdemeanors) in impeachment
proceedings evolved independently of and different from that lan
guage used in the ordinary criminal law. "High crimes and misde
meanors" represented a category of what can be called political "
offenses, but misdemeanors as it evolved in the criminal law "described criminal sanctions for private wrongs".

27

Again, "misde

meanors", as that term was used in the criminal law, never became
the criterion of "high misdemeanor" in the parliamentary law of

impeachment.

Nor did "high misdemeanor", as used in impeachment,

find Its way into the general criminal law of England.
26Ibid.
^Berger, Impeachment, p. 6l.

Thus "high

11

crimes and misdemeanors" were words of art confined to impeachment.

. Richard Woodeson, Blackstone's successor as Vinerlan lecturer, per
haps put it best when he labeled impeachable offenses as being of

a "peculiar quality".28 The reason they were "peculiar" was because
in many cases the offenses that fell under the phrase

-,igh crimes

and misdemeanors" were not encompassed by criminal' statutes or by
common law cases.

This was the history of English impeachment when

our founding fathers wrote our Constitution.

III.

Grounds For Impeachment:

The Indictability or Criminality Issue

Basically there are four primary sources for the contempo

rary interpretation of the provisions in the Constitution.
sources are the Constitutional Convention debates,

The

the ratification

conventions, the Federalist Papers, and the debates and the proceed

ings during the first session of Congress under the New Constitution.
In the following pages I will use those sources and others to support

my conclusion about the nature of impeachable offenses as it was in
tended by the Framers themselves,
A. ' Treason

For the definition of treason we are on fairly smooth

ground.

We are because the Constitution narrowly defined treason.

The reason for this, to put it in the words of James Wilson,

is

that "numerous and dangerous excrescences" had disfigured the law

of treason in England and so the Framers closely defined and limited
treason so that as Wilson said before the ratification convention

in Pennsylvania, Congress could not "extend the crime and punish

ment of treason."™

According to Article III, section 3 of the

28Ibid., P. 63.

29Ibld.t,pp. 5^-55-
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Constitution treason is defined as:

Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to
thler Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.

No person

shall be ,convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony
of two witnesses, to the same overt Act, or on Confession

in open Court.3°
No where in the Constitution is a crime so precisely defined
as that of treason.

The reason for this is because treason is with

out a doubt a crime of the most serious nature, and there is no

reason to think that the word means anything other than this, as it
is found in the impeachment provision.

Also of importance here is

that treason can be labeled a political crime,
offense against the State.

because it is an

.
B.

Bribery

Unlike treason, bribery is not defined in the Constitution.
And like the Framer's, we to must look to the common law for a
definition of bribery.

Basically, bribery means the giving or taking of something
as an inducement.

There is nothing inherently wrong with the giving

or taking of something,
is so Important.

but it is the connection between the two.that

For this reason the states of mind of both the

giver and the recipient become crucially important.

In other words,

it is the improper motive or intent behind the giving or receiving
of something that one must prove in a bribery case.

Like treason, I also believe bribery can be labeled a pol
itical offense.

of bribery,

in the impeachment clause,

of the State.
30

The reason for this is because the Framers talked

in the context of the officers

What one Is doing when he bribes an officer of the

Mason & Beaney, American Constitutional Law, p. 67k,
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State is in effect corrupting the administration of the State.

Therefore since bribery has an effect on politics it can be said
to be of a political nature.

C.

High Crimes and Misdemeanors

Never has a finite content been given to this phrase, and

since it's Inception in the United States Constitution, battles have

been waged as to what sort of misconduct it encompasses.

Obviously

then, one cannot simply say that the phrase means exactly that of
what our modern notion of the words crimes and misdemeanors would

indicate they do.

If the meaning were so simple to deduce, the

many arguments over it's meaning would, never have taken place.
Many arguments have been advanced as to what the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors" means.

I will first analyze the debates in

the Constitutional Convention and then take' up the other primary

arguments contrary to my interpretation of the phrase "high crimes
and misdemeanors".

The debates in the Constitutional Convention took place in

a private atmosphere.

Because, of this we are not allowed the luxury

of reviewing the full reproduction of those debates in order to dis

cover what exactly the founding fathers had in mind when they

pieced together our Constitution.

Instead we must rely on the partial

and sometimes incomplete notes of those men who attended the Constitu
tional Convention.

Another factor that hinders one in his search for

an understanding of impeachable offenses is that in the context of

it's monumental task, the Constitutional Convention"devoted very
little time to the question of impeachement.

But, enough time was

given to the question to show that the Founding Fathers deemed im

peachment to be of the utmost importance, and more importantly for

14

my purposes, that an impeachable offense may lie for something
less than a criminal or Indictable offense.

In order to determine whether or not impeachment must lie
for a crime constitutional authorities on both sides of the issue

have turned to the Convention debates for support.

The language

used by the Framers is examined not only in the final debate on
impeachment but also in prior debates.

The Constitutional Convention began in mid-May 1787, but it

was not until the latter part of July that the Convention took up
the impeachment of the President to any length.

Finally on July 20,

1787, the Convention approved a provision that the President was "to

be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or neglect

of duty."31

The provision cited above was approved for a second

time on July 26th.

The above discussion in the Convention is not

the.most important one that took place on the subject of impeachment

because it was directed toward the institution of impeachment itself,

and not in direct relation to impeachable offenses.

32

However, the

discussion is interesting in several respects because it does lend
an indirect insight to impeachable offenses.

This draft of the impeachment provision was changed on

August 6 by the committee of detail to read "treason, bribery,.or
corruption".

The new reading of the provision was the referred to

the committee of eleven and on September 4 this committee recommended
31

32

Simpson, Treatise on Federal Impeachment.-p. 10.
See Appendix A for reproduction of full debate.'

33

•^Albert Broderick, "What Are Impeachable Offenses?"

American Bar Association Journal. (April, 1974), p. 4l6,
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that the impeachment of the President be restricted to "treason

and bribery".

It was the debate on this proposal which took place

on September 8 that is most important.

This final discussion on

the grounds for impeachment was brief, probably taking no more than
five or ten minutes.

The debate begins with Colonel Mason when he

asks:

Why is the provision restrained to Treason and .
bribery only? Treason as defined by the Constitution will
not reach many great and dangerous offenses.
Hastings is
not guilty of Treason.
Attempts to subvert the Constitu
tion may not be Treason as above defined — As bills of
attainder which :-ave saved the British Constitution are

forbidden,

it is the more necessary to extend:

the power

of impeachments.-^
Mason then "moved to add after 'bribery1 the words or
maladministration".
After Gerry seconded. Mason, Madison
demurred:
"So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure
during the pleasure of the Senate."
But Morris rejoined
.."it will not be put in force & can do no harm — An election

every four years will prevent maladministration".

Still

without further debate or explanation on this point. Mason
"withdrew 'maladministration' & substitutes 'other high

crimes & misdemeanors' (agst. the State).^3
By a vote of eight to three this amendment passed.

The above de

bate was the final one on the grounds for impeachment, and that final

addition accounts for the words that are in our Constitution today.
And ever since its inception that final addition has never ceased

to cause controversy.

The language used,

in the above debates,

be

comes especially important at this time.

Irving Brant is the constitutional authority I found cited
most often as being in favor of impeaching for only criminal mis

conduct.

Brant, like all other authorites, agrees that our impeach

ment mechanism was modelled after that of England's.

However,

Black, C., Impeachment. p. 28.
35

p. 4l6.

Broderick, American Bar Association Journal. April,

197^,
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Brant rejects the idea that in order to help find the meaning of
this phrase one must look to English precedents.

To find the mean

ing of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" he is content to
turn to the Constitution and from there concludes that criminality

is required in order to impeach.

In reaching this conclusion Brant

relies on basically two propositions.

His first is that within the

Constitution there are numerous references which imply or connote

that impeachable acts are criminal.

His second proposition which

is drawn from his first is that because the Constitution speaks of

impeachable offenses in criminal terms or language, impeachment is
a criminal process.

Before I begin to analyze either of Brant's propositions an

important point must be made.

Again, Brant's book is the one I

found referred to most often in support of the strict interpretation

of the impeachment clause and it is for this reason important to

point out that his book was written in response to the impeachment
attempt on Justice William Douglas.

Since it was written to vindicate

Justice Douglas It is, therefore, hardly what one could call objective.
Brant begins his attempt to show that impeachable offenses
must be criminal by referring to the July 20, debate in the Con
stitutional Convention I mentioned earlier.

Referring to this debate

Brant says:

Puting together the various grounds of impeachment
that were formally placed before the convention, either
in individual motions or committee reports we find the

following:

maladministration (objected to and withdrawn)

neglect of duty, malversation, corruption, treason,
bribery, . . . incapacity, negligence*,or perfidy of the

Chief Magistrate, and treachery . . ^
36

Irving Brant, Impeachment Trial and Errors. (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf Inc.,

1972),

p.20.

17

In the very next paragraph he states that "perfidy and treachery
of the

sort Madison and Morrison had

treason".

37

He also states that

in mind would be a

"malversation is fraud

form of
in office

o o

[and thatjcorruption Implies criminal acts."

I think it is peculiar

that he says this but does not cite an example or a footnote to help

substantiate his position.

I agree with him only to the extent that

"perfidy and treachery" might or could amount to treason if it in

volved levying war against, the United States or in -giving aid or
comfort to our enemies.

limited to treason.

However, treachery and perfidy cannot be

According to Black's Law Dictionary treachery

can be defined as betraying one's trust and perfidy is defined as

betraying ones faith to do something.

39

No where, could I find a

definition of treachery and perfidy that was limited only to criminal
offenses.

And in the context in which those words were used there

is no reason to limit the definition to criminal misconduct.
Brant also talks of malversation and takes this to mean the

crime of fraud.

And again I would agree with him that malversation

includes fraud, but it is not limited to that.

The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language defines malversation as "misconduct
in public office".

40

There is no reason given to believe that mis

conduct in public office is necessarily limited to criminal conduct,
nor does the context in which it was used necessitate looking at it
in strictly criminal terms.

37Ibid.

38Ibid.
39

-^Black H., Black's Law Dictionary, pp. 1269 & 1668.

^°William Morris (editor), The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language. (Geneva, Illinois:
ing Co. Inc., 1970),

p. 791.

American Heritage Publish

18

•

A little later in his book Brant goes on to say that "only

incapacity and neglect of duty are nonindictable as felonies or
high misdemeanors".

He justifies both of these by saying that

neither were formally put forward in the debate and that gross and

willful neglect of duty would be' a violation of the oath of office.
This argument is not only weak but also somewhat inconsistent, and
it is so because his initial stand was that only crimes are impeach
able .

The problem of impeaching a president for incapacity has

not been an issue since 1967 when the 25th amendment was passed
which provides.that the Vice-President shall assume the duties of
President when the President is no longer able to discharge the

powers or duties of that office.

Therefore the issue that Brant

raises is really not an issue at all anymore.

Even in the latter-

1700's I seriously doubt that lacking capacity was a crime and
since it more than likely was not,

one finds the Framers again

speaking in less than criminal terms.
As for the neglect of,duty issue I disagree with Mr.

Brant that it was not formally put forward.

To th'e contrary,

it was part of the provision the Convention was debating on July
20.

So, it was formally put forward!

Thus what we have now is the

fact- that non-criminal misconduct was advanced at the beginning of
this debate and not once was it objected to because it was not
criminal misconduct, thereby exhibiting a belief that impeachable
behavior need not necessarily be criminal.

Until this point in his book Brant was willing to hold to

^*Brant,. Impeachment Trial and Errors, p. 20,
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the belief that all impeachable behavior must be criminal, but now

he is willing to admit that a breach of the President's oath of
office could be considered an impeachable offense.

This seems

rather inconsistent to me in view of his initial stand on the issue.

The important point at this time is that, in the reading I have done,
at no time has it been said or implied that a violation of the oath

of office, by itself, constitutes a crime.

Accordingly then a Pres

ident might breach his oath of office (ie., neglect of duty) which
states that "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to

the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution

of the United States'^ but, depending on the severity of that
breach, he may or may not have broken the law.

Again we find the

Framersspeaking of noncriminal impeachable offenses.

Thus what we

are left with in this argument, is that a President may be impeached
for a breach of his oath of office,

that this breach of the oath does

not in and of itself constitute a crime, therefore it is possible

for a President to be impeached for something less than a crime.

What we have up to this point then is an argument by Brant

that imputs criminality into the language used by the Framers, but
not once was it indicated by the Framers that only criminal acts

were what they had in mind in speaking of impeachable offenses.

In

fact the language they used could very easily be understood to mean
noncriminal as well as criminal offenses.

From this argument Brant goes directly to the language
used in the Constitution itself in his attempt to prove that
h2

,

Mason &Beaney, American Constitutional Law, p. 672.
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impeachment can only take place for a crime.

In doing so I find

it a bit peculiar that he never formally discussed the September 8
debate because it was during this debate that the Framers directly

addressed the issue of impeachable offenses.

And that debate was

the most important one that took place on impeachable offenses.

Mr.

Brant felt no need to discuss this debate, which I" think was an un
wise decision on his part.

While Brant does not discuss the September 8 debate, I
believe it is important because several inferences may be drawn from

it.

The first .follows from the fact that Mason questioned the im

peachment clause which was at that time limited to treason and

bribery.

He then mentioned that Hastings was not guilty of treason

and that attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason.
The above remarks .are interesting for basically three reasons.
First of all it shows that the Framers were aware of the

impeachment proceedings taking place against Hastings and they

knew of the offenses charged against him.

The statements made by

Mason also show that the Framers were concerned that the behavior

exhibited by Hastings was not impeachable under our Constitution,

thereby implying that it should be.

As mentioned earlier Hastings

was impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and according to the

House Judiciary Committee staff report, the articles of impeachment

included "both criminal and non-criminal offenses". ^ Since many
of the Framers were seemingly knowledgeable of the Hasting impeach
ment it is fair to conclude that they were concerned that certain

conduct, some of which was not criminal, was not impeachable according
^3

Staff of Impeachment Inquiry, Constitutional Grounds For
Presidential Impeachment, p. 7.
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to the Constitution as it was then worded.

Mason, with that in mind,

I assert, thus moved to add the word maladministration after the
word bribery in order to include all the conduct that impeachment

ought to remedy.

Madison objected to the term saying that it would

leave the President's tenure up to the pleasure of the Senate.
Gouveneur Morris then remarked that impeachment would not be put
into force and therefore it could do no harm.

And with no other

debate than this Mason withdrew maladministration and in it's place
substituted "high crimes and misdemeanors" which was passed.
The second interesting thing about this debate, then, is the fact

that Mason, the person who moved to add maladministration to the

impeachment clause in order that it reach all those offenses worthy
of impeachment, some of which might not be criminal, was the person

who, in the end, added high crimes and misdemeanors.

With hardly

any debate on his original motion, it would not seem logical or
reasonable that he would, a few minutes later, offer a phrase that

was limited strictly to criminal offenses.

I believe he accepted

the remark made by Madison and substituted the technical phrase

''high crimes and misdemeanors"

And I believe he did so in the belief

that it had a more serious and ascertainable meaning than did mal
administration thus removing the fear voiced by Madison but at the
same time reaching those offenses he was concerned with,

some of

which were not criminal.

As I discussed before "high crimes and misdemeanors" is a term

of art that was confined to impeachment in England.'
that the term included offenses that were

I also discussed

less than criminal as was

evidenced by the Hasting impeachment'"taking place _at the time of the
Convention.

So the noncriminal use of "high crimes and misdemeanors",
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by Parliament, was still occurring.

The use-of maladministration

as a reason for impeaching, was, to vague a term, because it would
have allowed the very thing Gerald Ford said in April of 1970 to

happen.

In speaking of the Douglas impeachment Ford was asked what

an impeachable offense was.

His answer was:

The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense
is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives con'siders it to be at a given moment in history; conviction
results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the
other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require

removal of the accused from office.44
Statements like Gerald Ford's is why maladministration was

objected to, I assert, and not because it included noncriminal mis
conduct, it was to vague and the Framer's recognized this danger.
A review of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" does not
leave the impeachment of a president up to the whim of Congress.
As I said earlier while "high crimes and misdemeanors" was not limited,
to crimes it's boundries reached only serious misconduct.
Third and last I believe that since it appears Mason moved

to add High crimes and misdemeanors in order that all the necessary
misconduct be reached, again,

some of which was not criminal,

it .im

plies that he was at least somewhat familiar with the Parliamentary
use of that phrase.
acts and Mason,

for that reason.

The Parliament did not limit that term to criminal

I believe,

chose the term high crimes and misdemeanors

We know that Mason was at least partly familiar

with impeachment in England and it is quite possible that most of

the other convention members were to.
I have done,

It seems to me,

from the reading

that all of the Framers were intimately familiar with

English history, and many of them were lawyers, of which "at least
4*f

,
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nine had studied law in England". ^ When combined, these facts could
reasonably lead one to believe that most of the Framers did have some
knowledge of the English impeachment process.

This is even further

substantiated by the fact that our impeachment mechanism is very
similar to England's in a number'of ways and is in fact modelled
after England's.
Ex-President Nixon's attorney also discusses the constitu
tional grounds for presidential impeachment in a brief.

St. Clair

begins his discussion of impeachment by saying that our impeachment
mechanism was modelled after that of Great Britian's.

He in fact

agrees with me that "the language of the impeachment clause is

derived directly from the English impeachments". 46

But}he then

goes on to say that there is no evidence to attribute anything but
a criminal meaning to the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors in

light of the American and English history and usage from the time
of Blackstone onward.

though.

There is no evidence to support this statement

While it is true that most impeachments for"high crimes and

misdemeanors"in England, during the eighteenth century (Blackstone
era) did involve crimes, not all did and Hasting!s*impeachment is
a good example.

As it was pointed out earlier, some of the offenses

for which Hasting's was impeached were criminal, and others clearly

were .not.

And even if the impeachments tried then had been for crimes,

there is absolutely no reason to believe, as St. Clair implies, that
^5
Staff of Impeachment Inquiry, Constitutional Grounds For
Presidential Impeachment, p. 12,
46

James D. St. Clair & Staff, Summary An Analysis of the
Constitutional Standard For Presidential Impeachment, (Washington
D.C.:

1974), p. 2.
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the Framers adopted the phrase high crimes' and misdemeanors only
as it was'used from around 1725 onward.

I could not find one shred

of evidence that indicated that the Framers adopted the impeachment

language only from a certain time forward, thus there is no reason
to suppose they did.

The September 8 debate in the Constitutional Convention was

then taken up by St. Clair.

According to him "the debates clearly

indicate a purely criminal meaning for other high crimes and misdemeanors".

47

He draws this inference from the fact that the vague

standard of maladministration was objected to and withdrawn by Mason

and in it's place was substituted high crimes and misdemeanors.

As

I argued before, maladministration was not objected to because it was
not criminal in nature but because it left the President's tenure

strictly up to the Senate's pleasure.

Maladministration had almost

no boundries at all but a review ofvhigh crimes and misdemeanors'
shows that it does.

That phrase reached the types of misconduct of

concern to the convention members but at the same time provided
limits on the House and Senate that were not present with the use

of maladministration.

And again the offenses Mason mentioned were

those committed by Hastings,
fell short of Treason.

some of which were not criminal, that

Thus the only thing that is clear about the

debates is the fact that impeachable offenses must be serious, but

the implication is not that they must be criminal but that they may
be either criminal or non-criminal.

The Ex-President's attorney then goes on to'argue that the
phrase high crimes and misdemeanors means exactly what the words

47
Ibid,,

p. 3.
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connote, and that is, criminal offenses, and that this criminality
is further reinforced by the language used in talking about impeach
ment.

I do not believe the phrase clearly connotes criminality.

If

the meaning is so clear, then why did he find it necessary to write

a brief arguing the meaning of the phrase?

ing of the phrase is not very clear.

Obviously then, the mean

And since as St. Clair says,

the language of the impeachment clause was derived directly from
the English impeachments, and since .the Framers made no attempt to

limit it's meaning and usage I assert that it (the phrase high crimes
and misdemeanors) was adopted with it's history in tact thus not
limiting impeachment to crimes indictable or otherwise.

Thus it seems to me that the phrase^high crimes and mis

demeanors" was chosen by Mason, and approved by the convention,
because

it was a more limited term than maladministration but

still reached serious non-criminal offenses.

it

They must be serious

in nature because high modifies misdemeanors as well as crimes and

if nothing else common sense would require them to be serious.
The Framers looked to the Constitution for the definition of trea

son.

Bribery was not defined in that document and' so the Framers

were content to look to the common lav/ to give it content.

Neither

is high crimes and misdemeanors defined in the Constitution.

put it in Justice Story's words then,

To

since

High crimes and misdemeanors are not defined by any
statute of the United States (nor, it may be added, by
any English statute), resort, then, must be had either to
the parliamentary practice and tne common law, in order to
ascertain what are high crimes and misdemeanors, or the
whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion of

the Senate.4ti
48
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Resort must be had to the parliamentary law and the common

law because Story pointed out earlier there is no federal common

law of crimes and Congress never defined, by statute,^high crimes
and misdemeanors,''

And since the Framers did not leave impeachment

to the discretion of the Senate one must turn to English parlia

mentary law and common law for a

meaning.♦

To put it a slightly different way high crimes and misde

meanors' has, according to the staff of the House Judiciary committee,
traditionally been considered a term of art.

And according to the

staff report on impeachment "the Supreme Court has held that such
phrases must be construed, not according to modern usage, but
according to what the Framers meant when they adopted them".

49

Chief Justice Marshall perhaps put it best when he wrote of another
such phrase:

It is a technical term.
It is used in a very old
statute of that country whose language is our language,
and whose laws form the substratum of our laws.

It is

scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the
framers of our constitution in the

sense which had been

affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it.^°
Another difficult problem faced by those who would limit -

impeachable offenses to criminal conduct is posed by the doctrine
announced in.the Holmes v,

Jennison decision that each word

in the

Constitution must be given meaning and none can be discarded as
superfluous.

If one was to consider the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors by itself, dissociated from the Constitution and all his

torical background the word "misdemeanors cannot logically be limited
49

^Staff of Impeachment Inquiry, Constitutional Grounds For
Presidential Impeachment, p. 12,

5°Ibld., p. 13.
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to its meaning in the criminal lav/ —

that is, all crimes which do

51
not amount to felonies".

The reason for this is that misdemeanors

is encompassed within the term crimes"
or debate.

Misdemeanor,

This fact is beyond doubt

basically is used to indicate lesser sorts

of crimes, but it is a crime nevertheless.

Therefore if the no
M

it-

superfluous words doctrine is to be followed misdemeanors must be
interpreted to include non-criminal misconduct if it is to have an
independent meaning.

As Paul Fenton said in his article "the word

crimes was used to negative the thought that the only criminal
offenses for which an impeachment would lie were treason and

bribery; and the word misdemeanors was used to negate the thought
that only crimes were impeachable.

52

The Holmes v. Jennison decision did not concern impeachment

directly but it did announce a doctrine that can be applied to the
language used in the impeachment clause of the Constitution.

And

if one accepts the validity of this doctrine and applies it to the
phrase "high crimes and misdemeanor", by itself, dissociated from

the Constitution and any historical background, it becomes necessary
to read the term "misdemeanors" to include non-criminal offenses.

Thus, what we have up to this point is the fact that the

Framers never limited themselves, in talking of impeachment, to
offenses that were strictly criminal in nature.

Instead, I found

the Framer's referring to impeachment, over and over again, in terms
that imply less than' criminality.

Doctor Franklin used the term

"misconduct" In relation to impeachment.

James Madison in turn

used the terms negligence or perfidy" in speaking of impeachment.
51 .

Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment, p. 668.

52Ibld.. p. 669.
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Along the same line Edmund Randolph thought that impeachment should
be provided for because the Executive has many opportunities to
abuse his power.

The final language in our Constitution was adopted

after the term maladministration was objected to because of it's

vagueness and not. because it had non-criminal implications.

The

question must be asked, why didn't the Framers simply write "or
other high crimes" as they did,

for example, in the provision deal

ing with the extradition of criminal offenders from one state to
another?

53

If it was the seriousness _of the offense they meant to

emphasize, they could have done so more directly, but they did not.
Instead, a unique phrase that had been used for centuries in the
English Parliamentary impeachments was adopted.

Impeachment in

England.was not limited to crimes and the Framers indicated they
knew of the impeachment mechanism in that country.

There are several other arguments put forth by Brant, and
other constitutional authorities, who argue that impeachment, and
therefore "high crimes and misdemeanors" must be limited to crimes.

The first argument

is "that only those offences are impeachable

which were indictable crimes at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, when there was no common law of the United States".

This argument, it seems to me, is manifestly wrong.

Anyone who has

read the Constitution knows that it is an instrument that speaks in

general terms.

The document was written not for the past, but rather

so that it could easily adapt to the present and future.

It was per

haps best said by the great Justice Story in the case Martin v.
53
54
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Hunter's Lesses.

The Constitution unavoidably deals in general

language. It did not suit the purpose of the people,
in framing the great charter of our liberties to pro
vide for minute specifications of its powers, or to de
clare the means by which those powers should be carried
into execution.
It was seen that this would be a perilous
and difficult, if not impracticable task.
The instrument
was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of

a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of
ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrut
able purposes of Providence.
It could not be foreseen
what new changes and modifications of power might be in
dispensable to effectuate the general objects of the
charter; and restrictions and specifications which at the
.present, might seem salutory, might, in the end, prove
the overthrow of the system itself.

Hence its powers are

expressed in general terms, leaving to the Legislature,
from time to time,

to adopt its own means to effectuate

legitmate objects, and to mold and model the exercise of
its powers, as its own wisdom and the public interests

shall require,55
Thus I think the above mentioned argument is very weak, and wrong
to boot.

Another argument put forth by Brant is that the language
used in the Constitution itself proves that impeachment must lie
for a crime.

The Constitutional language relied on to show that

impeachment deals only with crimes includes such terms as: "to try,"
"convicted," "pardons for offenses . . . except impeachment," "con

viction of," and "trial of all crimes except . . . impeachment."^
I am somewhat awed by Brant's treatment of such terms, because

absolutely no discussion about them takes place.

Instead, he seems

to take for granted that the terms are a self evident truth that
impeachable offenses must be crimes.

First I will take up the so-called criminal terms of "to

55simpson, Treatise on Federal Impeachment, p. 31.
56 •
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try," "convicted," and "conviction of."

I would be interested in

knowing what other terms might be used in their place, but again
no examples or references were given.

The use of these terms in

the context of impeachment is of no special significance as far as
I could discover.

According to Black's Law Dictionary to try means

"to examine judicially; to examine and investigate a controversy, by
the legal method called "trial," for the purpose of determining the

issues it involves."^

Again, according to the same dictionary men

tioned above, neither is the term "convicted" limited to use in the
criminal law.

The term "convicted" means "that a judgment of final

condemnation has been pronounced against the accused."

58

Likewise,

neither is the term "conviction" limited only to use in the criminal

law.

Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "conviction" as "in a

general sense the result of a criminal trial ..." but the dictionary

goes.on to state that "in legal parlance, it jconvlet lorn often denotes
the final judgment of the court."

59

And according to the Black's

dictionary the term "final judgment" means "one which puts an end to
a suit or action."

Thus,

at -no time did I find the above mentioned

language limited only to use in the criminal law.

There is nothing

magical about those words in the sense that they are limited to the
criminal law, and Black's Law Dictionary shows this to be true.

So,

to take the strictly criminal approach to these terms, as has Brant,
is Indefensible.

Although the terms may be used more often in some

57 Black H.,

Black's Law Dictionary, p. 403.,
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categories than in others, it is not strictly limited to the criminal
law.

What Mr. Brant seems to imply is that if the Framers intended

impeachment to lie for offenses less than criminal then they should
have formulated a new set of terms or language to say that.

To re

quire so much would have probably been a near impossible task given
the circumstances.

Now to take up such phrases as:

"pardons for offenses . . .

except impeachment," and "trial of all crimes except . . , impeach
ment".

These phrases do pose difficult and sometimes confusing

issues, but they are by no means insuperable,

I will address the

phrase concerning pardons first.

There are basically two other ways to view the problem
posed by the phrase concerning pardons, and both are reasonable
ones.

One way,

is to view the term "offenses" as used in Article

II, Section 2 as something that amounts to less than a crime.

In

other words the term "offenses" was used because it was. recognized

that there were some sorts of offenses "which were not crimes, and
they included fines,

penalties and forfeitures" and these offenses
'61

"could be pardoned by the President".

But, there were offenses

"resulting in a conviction upon Impeachment" and those "the Presi-

dent was not permitted to pardon."0^
The second interpretation on this phrase Is to treat the

term "offenses" as synonymous with crimes.

This seems to go against

the grain of my thesis, but not necessarily so.

It must be remem

bered that impeachment was an English invention and we modelled our
61
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impeachment proceedings after that of England's.
in dispute.

This fact is not

I think it is quite possible that the Framers thought

it wise to bar a presidential pardon after impeachment and conviction

thus profiting from the pardon of the Earl of Danby by Charles II.
In doing so they overlooked some lack of harmony in detail because
as, Berger states, the "separation of removal from subsequent indictr*
~%
63
ment and'conviction had rendered itIpardonJunnecessary".

Thus

in the Framer's attempt to assure that our President could not do
what Charles II had done they overlooked the fact that they created

a discrepancy.

This is not an unreasonable interpretation in light

of the fact that the Framers were looking at the English model of

impeachment and trying to adapt it to their own needs minus of course
the faults they saw it as having.

And one such fault was that a

king could pardon someone who had been impeached in England and the
Framers did not want that to happen in the United States.

Now comes the phrase "trial of all crimes except . . . im

peachment".

Like the last phrase that was discussed, this one also

C8n be approached two different, ways.
The first approach relies on the assumption taken in this

thesis, and that is that an impeachment may or may not lie for.b.
crime.

The argument is basically that an impeachment proceeding is

a trial, and that because the trial may or may lie for a crime it
was necessary "therin to exclude impeachments in order to avoid the

implication, which otherwise might arise, that criminal impeachments
should be tried by a jury".

63,'Berber,
64
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I assert that this is a logical and reasonable argument if

one is willing to accept the assumption that an impeachment may or

may not lie for a crime.

If one is unwilling to accept this argument

there is still another which might possibly be even more difficult
to overcome.

This argument initially accepts the assumption that

an impeachment must proceed on a crime.

'The reading of impeachment in criminal terms runs into

problems when it is read in contrast to the Sixth Amendment which
states in part that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial

jury." * Accordingly then, if impeachment is to be deemed a criminal
prosecution it is difficult to escape the requirement of the Sixth
Amendment.

As Berger says, the Framers had exempted impeachment from

the jury trial of all crimes be Article III, Section 2, clause 3»
"and with that exemption before them, the draftsmen of the Sixth
Amendment extended trial by jury to all criminal prosecutions without

exception thereby exhibiting an intention to withdraw the former
exception."

Thus it must be,concluded that either the Framers did

not exempt impeachment from the Sixth Amendment because they did not
believe impeachment to be a criminal prosecution or that if in fact
impeachment does amount to a criminal prosecution then it requires

a jury trial.

The latter statement poses even more problems when

viewed according to the Supreme Court's well known rule that "the
last expression of the will of the law maker prevails over the earlier

67

one".

According to this rule then,

•^Berger, Impeachment, p. 81.

66Ibld.t p. 82.
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prosecution the accused must have a public trial by an impartial

jury.

And further yet, if an impeachment is seen as a criminal

prosecution but is not included in the Sixth Amendment wording "all
criminal prosecution" one has placed upon him the burden of proving

that the normal meaning of the word "all" means less than all.
Thus in the above instances all the problems associated

with impeachment are alleviated if one does not read criminality into
the process.

And so,far, I believe I have provided reasonable reasons

why one should not read Impeachment in strictly criminal terms.
The last major argument Brant puts forth is that impeach

ment proceedings constitute a criminal process.
drawn from the words used

cussed above.

Since,

in the Convention and

in fact,

shown, let alone proven,

This conclusion is
the Constitution dis

it has not satisfactorily been

that the words; to try, conviction and so

on necessitate looking at impeachment in a strictly criminal light
this conclusion is very questionable to say the least. . If one is
still not satisfied with the above arguments there are at least two
other things that must be considered.

The first is a statement by Justice Story and another by
James Wilson who was in fact one of the Framers of our Constitution

and was later a Supreme Court Justice.

Justice Story said that im

peachment is:

A proceeding purely of a political nature.
so muc h

It is not

designed to punish an offender as to secure the

state against e^ross, official misdemeanors.
It touches
neither his person nor his property, but simply divests

him of his political capacity.68
And James Wilson said:

""Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment, p. 682.
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Impeachments . . . come not . . . within the sphere of
ordinary jurisprudence.
They are founded on different

principles; are govern ed by different maxims, and are di
rected to different objects; for this reason, the trial
and punishment of an offense on impeachment, is no bar
to a trial and punishment of the same offense at common

law.69
If one was to contrast these statements with the fact that Article

I, Section 3t clause 7 separates impeachment and removal from
office,

from subsequent indictment and punishment and at the same

time keeping in mind-that in England impeachment and punishment were

wedded, then one is led to believe that impeachment in the United
States is more of a political process than a criminal process.

Thus

Impeachment seems to be a political process necessary for maintaining
efficient government and thus leaving to a separate criminal proceed
ing the problem of punishment.
Suppose however that one is not satisfied with the above

argument that removal is not, in the pure sense of the word, a

punishment.

I believe that Article I, Section 3, clause 7 clearly

dispells the notion that removal is to be regarded as punishment, but,
for the time being let us assume that impeachment is a criminal

process and that removal is a punishment rather than a remedy for
inefficient government.

If impeachment is a criminal process and removal is a

punishment, how does one reconcile that with the double jeopardy
provision in the Fifth Amendment?

According to a Supreme Court

ruling "life and limb" has been expanded to mean twice "placed

in peril of lesal penalties upon the same accusation;"

Clearly

then, if removal Is the criminal punishment resulting from the

69Ibld.. .p. 635.
70
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criminal process of impeachment a constitutional doubt is raised as
to whether the subsequent indictment and trial violates the double
jeopardy provision of the Constitution.

If, however, impeachment

is a political process, as I believe it is, which is designed not

as a punishment, but rather a remedy for the State, then the double
jeopardy provision is not offended or violated.
The preceeding arguments are those that are commonly relied
on by the constitutional authorities who take the position that
impeachment must lie for a criminal offense.

The arguments presented

do not constitute a conclusive list but rather are only those argu

ments I believe most challenging to my thesis and that is that an

impeachable offense need not necessarily lie for a crime.

So far

I have relied mostly on comments that occured in the Convention,

I

now turn my attention to other remarks,.chiefly those made during
the various ratification conventions and the First Congress.

Other

contemporary remarks will also be cited.
The ratification conventions indicated that a president could

only be impeached for serious offenses.

But again, at no time did I

find the Framers limiting themselves strictly to criminal offenses.
I believe the only reasonable conclusion one can draw from the
various conventions is that an impeachable offense may,
have

to be a

but does not

crime.

In the Virginia ratification convention James Madison in

talking about the Senate's ppwer to ratify treaties was asked what

would happen if the President summoned only a few Senators of a few

states?

His response was that, "were the President to commit anything

so atrocious ... he would be impeached and convicted, as a majority
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of the states would be affected by his misdemeanor".

71

According

to a Stanford Law Review dealing with impeachment this was not an
act "that would have been criminal under existing statutes".
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In

the South Carolina ratification convention Charles Cotesworth

Pinckney stated that the power of impeachment reached those who

would "betray their public trust".73 Edward Rutledre in the same
74

convention said that an "abuse of trust by the President"'
impeachable.

would be

At no time was it said or even remotely implied that

these betrayals or abuses must be criminal, and thus there is no
reason to believe they must be so limited.
If the offenses subject to impeachment were to be limited

strictly to crimes why didn't the Framer's so confine themselves?
These remarks may not be proof that impeachment can lie for less
than a crime but I do believe it would be odd that not one,

but

several of the Framers had the same misconception.

The First Congress has also been an important .source for

the interpretation of the Constitution.

It was durin? this Congress

that Madison successfully argued the appropriateness of the removal
power of the president.

The danger,

During.this debate Madison said:

then,

consists merely in this:

The Presi

dent can displace from office a man whose merits require
that he

should

be continued

in it.

What will be the motives

which the president can feel for such abuse of his power
and the restraints that operate to prevent it?
In the first
71
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place, he will be impeachable by this House before the
Senate for such an act of maladministration;
that the wanton removal of meritorious

for I contend

officers would

sub

ject him to impeachment and removal from his own high

trust.?5
Madison also said in connection with the removal power of the Pres
ident:

I think it absolutely necessary that the President
should have the power of removing from office; it will make
him, in a peculiar manner, responsible for their conduct,
and subject him to impeachment himself, if he suffers
them to perpetuate with impunity high crimes or misdemean

ors against the United States, or neglects to superintend

their conduct, so as to check their excesses,76
This is only one part of the many arguments that took place
during the First Congress, but it was also the only argument I found

dealing with impeachment.

The important point to get out of this

argument is that the language used does not limit itself to criminality.

Neglecting to superintend the excesses of ones officers could easily
fall outside the scope of criminal conduct.

During the convention and shortly after many enlightening
statements were made that have a bearing on this thesis.

James

Wilson, who was later to become, a Supreme Court Justice, equated
malversation with high misdemeanors!

cannot be limited to criminal conduct.

As I said earlier malversation

It may include criminal con

duct but it is not possible to limit it to that.

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist number 65 indicated that
high crimes and misdemeanors should not be limited to criminal

offenses.

During his discussion of the Senate's role in trying
75
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impeachments, he said:

The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in
other words,

from the abuse or violation of some public

trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar
propriety be dominated POLITICAL as they relate chiefly to
injuries dome immediately to the society itself.'<

Again, this discussion is not limited to criminal offenses,

I do

not believe the misconduct of public men, or the abuse or violation

of public trust talked about by Hamilton can, in good faith, be
limited to criminal offenses.

If he meant that only criminal con

duct was impeachable why didn't he say so?

I believe that here, as

in all the other instances concerning impeachment, criminality was

not specified as being the controlling factor in impeachment because
it is not controlling.

Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution

talked, of Impeachment in much the same vein.

In 1833 he wrote:

Not but that crimes of a strictly legal character fall
within the scope of the power . . .; but that .it has a

more enlarged operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed
political offenses, growing out of personal misconduct or
gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the
public interests, in the discharge of the duties of pol
itical office.
These are so various in their character,and so indefinable in their actual involutions, that it is

almost impossible to provide systematically for them by
positive law.
They must be examined upon very broad and
comprehensive principles of public policy and duty.
They

must be judged of by the habits and rules and principles
of diplomacy, or departmental operations and arrangements,

of parliamentary practice', or executive customs and ne
gotiations of foreign as well as domestic political move
ments; and in short, by a great variety of circumstances,
as well those which aggravate as those which extenuate or
justify the offensive acts which do not properly belong
to the judicial character in the ordinary administration
of justice, and are far removed from the reach of municipal

jurisprudence.'"

77Ibid., p. 9.
7fi
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Justice Story all but spells out the fact that impeachable offenses
are not limited to crimes when he says that they (impeachable
offenses) are not of a strictly legal character.

In talking of

impeachable offenses another court put it somewhat differently.
The

court

said:

It may be safely asserted that where the act of official
delinquency consists in the violation of some provision of
the constitution or statute which is denounced as a crime'

or misdemeanor, or where it is a mere neglect of duty will
fully done, with a corrupt intention, or where the negli
gence is so gross and the disregard of duty so flagrant
as to warrant the inference that it was x^illful and corrupt,
'it is within the definition of a misdemeanor in office.
But where it consists of a mere error of judgment or omis

sion of duty without the element of fraud, and where the
negligence is attributable to a misconception of duty
rather than a willful disregard thereof,

it is not impeach

able, although it may be highly prejudicial to the interests

of the State.79
This interpretation also does not limit Impeachable offenses to
criminal conduct.

Like most other interpretations I could find this

court limited Impeachable offenses to serious misconduct without re
gard to its criminality.
Thus one is faced with the numerous remarks in the Convention,

during the Convention, in the ratification conventions, and other,
contemporary remarks which I believe show that"impeachment may lie

for less than a crime.

There are,

however, at least two other factors

I wish to discuss before this thesis ends that will help to clarify

and justify my position.

They are the Andrew Johnson impeachment,

and a few final considerations.

I will begin with the Johnson im

peachment.

1.

The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson

. Only once in our constitutional history has a president ever
79

Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment, p. 682.

been impeached by the House of Representatives,

The president was

Andrew Johnson and the year was 1868.

The political, social, and economic conditions were much
different than they are today and were in fact in a peculiar con
dition even then.

The wounds of the Civil War were still raw, and

the nation was still in the process of becoming whole again.

It

was into this period of reconstruction that Andrew Johnson was
thrust as a result of the assassination of Abraham lincoln.

More than anything else, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson
has served a reminder to us that political passions should play no

part in our impeachment process.

Thus, while the Johnson impeach

ment must be discounted in many respects,

it does serve as a warn

ing against the llghthearted resort to such removal of the President,
Andrew Johnson was a Southerner,
a formal education.

from North Carolina without

Johnson entered politics as a young man and

his ascent of the political ladder was a rapid one.

He. was elected

to the Tennessee state legislature in 1835, and later went on to be
come a member of the United States House of Representatives, Governor

of his state, and by 1857 had become a member of the United States
Senate.

When the Civil War began he was the only Southern Democratic

Senator to remain loyal to the Federal Government.

Lincoln was so

impressed with his loyalty and devotion to the Union that, in 1862,
he appointed him the military Governor of Tennessee.

And when the

1864 presidential campaign r.olled around, Johnson was chosen to be
Lincoln's running mate on the Union (Republican) party ticket.
While he was an admired politician,

he had only a very small

political following after the assassination of Lincoln.

Initially,

after becoming President the Radical wing of the Republican party
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was overjoyed.

The Radical Republicans favored harsh and rather

vindictive measures in Reconstruction and they believed Johnson
would support their policies.
Johnson soon waned as

However, Radical enthusiasm for

it became obvious that he was a

pendent will and strong mind.
ment of the Confederate states.

man of inde

The immediate problem was the treat
Were they to be regarded as still

part of the Union, and treated as if they had never left,

or were

they to "be regarded as conquered provinces, to be readmitted as

states under such conditions as Congress should prescribe and they
should agree to?"

The problems began when President Johnson

adopted the former view and Congress the latter.

When the Radical Congress reconvened in December of 1865
they took immediate steps to assure a legislative influence In re
construction.

The representatives from the Southern states that

had formed new states according to Johnson's guidelines were not

permitted to take their seats in Congress, and a. joint committee
was assembled to prepare a Congressional plan for reconstruction.

Early in 1866 Congress passed the Freedman•s Bureau Act which was
designed to protect the blacks from discrimination in the South.

Johnson successfully vetoed this act and Congress countered with

the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

Johnson refused to sign this act into

law but the veto was quickly overridden.
see a veto of his upheld.

Johnson would never again

For the rest of the time he served as

President, he and Congress remained at each others throats.

Instead

of a co-operative effort between the two branches to "determine a

workable reconstruction program it turned into a bitter struggle.
fin
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The only question was:

Who would win?

Johnson did little to improve his position in the eyes of'
Congress.

He made many remarks and speeches so critical of Congress

that one speech in particular became the basis for one of the eleven
articles of impeachment against him.

Early in 1867 the Radical Congress took further steps to
assure their control over the reconstruction process.

they moved against the presidency itself.

To do this

In March, 1.867 the Tenure

of Office Act was passed over Johnson's veto.

Under the provisions

of the act the President could not remove from office any official

that had been appointed with the approval of the Senate without
their consent.

Johnson believed the act to be unconstitutional.

Although the Constitution speaks only of the presidential power of
appointment and not of removal, it had been common practice since
the Constitution's inception that cabinet officers served only at
the pleasure of the President who had appointed them.

As strange

as it may seem, of all his cabinet members none seemed to be more
opposed to the Tenure of Office Act than was Edwin M. Stanton.

In the months that followed the passing of the Tenure of
Office Act Stanton became an active ally of the Radicals in Congress.
For a while President Johnson put up with Stanton's disloyalty,

probably because of his own unstable position.

Finally, Stanton

became too much of a problem and on August 5, 1867 Johnson asked for
his resignation.

Disregarding his earlier stand, Stanton refused

and Johnson promptly suspended him from his post.

In his place

Johnson appointed General Ulysses S. Grant as Secretary of War.
At the time Stanton was removed Congress was not in session

so the issue remained up in the air until they reconvened.

In
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January, Congress rejected Johnson's explanation for the removal of
Stanton and demanded his reinstatement.

It was Johnson's hope that

Grant would refuse to give up his office and thus force Stanton to
seek redress in the courts.

However, Grant backed down and Stanton

resumed his office.

Finally in February, Johnson formally^ dismissed the Secretary
of War and replaced him with Major-General Lorenzo Thomas.

Again

Congress refused to accept or confirm the new appointment.

By this time the conflict between the two branches of
government had finally come to a head.

Two previous attempts had

been made to impeach Johnson, but both had failed.
Congress would succeed.

This time

Within a short time an impeachment resolu

tion was introduced in the House of Representatives and was quickly

reported out of committee.

Finally on February 24, the House

voted 126 - 47 to impeach President Johnson for high crimes and
misdemeanors in office.

Within a week the Radical Congress had

drawn up eleven articles of impeachment and had appointed seven
managers to act as prosecutors j.n the trial before the Senate.
Of the eleven articles presented ten related to the re

moval of Secretary of War Stanton.
Primarily, the House charged as a high crime and misde
meanor that on February 21 the President.did unlawfully
"issue an order in writing for the removal of Edwin M.

Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department
of War . . . which order was unlawfully issued with intent
then and there

the act entitled

'An act regulat

ing the tenure of certain civil officers',

to violate

passed March 2,

1867."8t
The only other article was article ten and In it the House
charged primarily that the President:

8lIbid. , 138.
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Unmindful of the high duties of his office and the
dignity and proprieties thereof, and of the harmony and
courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between
the executive and legislative branches of the government
of the United States . . . did attempt to bring in to dis

grace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress
of the United States and

the several branches thereof,

to

impair and destroy the regard and respect of all the good
people of the United States for the Congress and legislative
power . . . did . . . make and deliver with a loud voice
certain intemperate, inflamatory, and scandalous harangues,
and did therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces as

•well against Congress as the laws of the United States

duty enacted thereby . . . 2
The approval of this article was rather ironic in sight of the fact,
according to Raoul Berger, that the speeches delivered by Johnson
were more injurious to himself than to Congress.

Suffice it to say that the trial of President Johnson made

a mockery of justice.

On many occasions Chief Justice Chase was

overridden on questions of evidence.

Most questions were resolved

in.favor of the Radicals, and logically enough,

since the Radicals

constituted a majority and a simple majority was all that was needed
to override the Chief Justices'

decision.

-When the trial finally concluded some thirty-five days
later a vote was taken on nine of the articles, and on each one the

vote was the same: 35 for and 19 against, a single vote shy of the
necessary two-thirds majority.

The Congress then adjourned for a

little over a v/eek before taking a vote on the two remaining articles.
More than likely the adjournment was made in an attempt to convert

at least one member to an anti-Johnson stand.

On May 26, the final

.vote was taken and again the vote was: 35 for and 19 against.

No

converts had been made.

One must be very careful in relying upon the Johnson
Op
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impeachment as a precedent.

Never before and since have the passions

of our leaders been as aroused.

Because of this I believe it best

that the impeachment attempt of President Johnson failed.

Although

he was impeached primarily for violations of the Tenure of Office Act
those violations were not the real reasons he was Impeached.

Ac

tually his impeachment was an attempt to make him subservient to

Congress, and I would argue most authorities would accept that view.
Johnson was impeached mainly for a violation of the Tenure

of Office Act.

Johnson saw the Act as an intrusion into or usurpa

tion of, that power traditionally belonging exclusively to the Pres
ident.

Thus he thought the act to be unconstitutional.

It seems

to me this decision fell under the ambiguous term executive privilege

and therefore this act might have been rightfully disobeyed.

However,

I am not an authority on executive privilege"and therefore must defer

judgment to someone more knowledgeable on the subject than myself.

It is interesting to note however, that the Supreme Court,, did,
some years later, declare the act to be unconstitutional.

Last, but definitely not least important, is the fact that

the Johnson impeachment did establish a precedent, even though the'
propemess of it is questionable.

And for those people who believe

that the law, and precedent in common law, must be strictly adhered
to, must accept the fact that President Johnson was impeached on
article ten for high misdemeanor, and article ten was clearly not
criminal. Therefore according to the precedent set by the Congress
of 1868 impeachable conduct need not necessarily be criminal. The
fact that he was not convicted does not support my thesis nor does

it support the opposite point of view.

An acquittal does not mean

that the Senate does not approve or accept the articles of impeachment

47

voted by the House, but only means, as in a regular jury trial, that

the defendent has been found not guilty of the acts charged against
him.

Ex-President Nixon's attorney, also spoke of the Johnson

impeachment.

As I did in this thesis, St. Clair says that one must

be careful in relying on the Johnson impeachment because of the way
in which it was carried out.

But he did not stop there and instead

went on to say that "his acquittal strongly indicates that the

Senate has refused to adopt a broad view of other high crimes and

misdemeanors as a basis for impeaching a president". * Again, I
must mention that an acquittal does not necessarily mean the articles

of impeachment voted by the House were unacceptable, but could just
as easily mean that the defendent was not proven guilty of those acts
charged against him.

And I would further argue that a failure to

impeach by a single vote, as-was the case with Johnson, is not a
strong indication of anything,.as St. Clair would have one believe.

Thus the impeachment of Andrew Johnson does nothing to disprove my
thesis.

There are a few final considerations that are important in

a discussion of impeachable offenses, and those are taken up next.
3.

Some Final Considerations

Charles Black, a professor from the Yale University Law School
wrote a small handbook on impeachment, and in that book he made several

interesting comments on impeachable offenses.

I will mention only

three of the examples he cites of presidential conduct that would

not be impeachable if one were to adopt a strictly criminal inter"

ii

pretation of the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors but would at the

'St.Clair, Summary An Analysis of. p. 5.
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same time be hostile to the nature and purpose of our Constitution.

His first example begins by supposing that an American

president has moved to Saudi Arabia.

The reason for this move was

so that he could have four wives, a practice prohibited in the United
States.

And since the President has decided to live there, with his

four wives, he would have to conduct the office of presidency from

there by way of the mail, telephone, and wire service.

Black puts

it "is it possible that such gross and wanton neglect of duty could
84

not be grounds for impeachment?"
This is a rather extreme example and the chances of some

thing like it happening are probably next to zero but it does how
ever, test the overall validity of the proposition that all impeach
able offenses must be crimes.

I cannot believe that the phrase

high crimes and misdemeanors,

as used by the Framers, would not

reach this sort of behavior on the part of a president.

The second example Black gives concerns the President's

appointment power.

He said suppose,

for instance,

that a president

announced that he would not, under any circumstances,

appoint a

person to office if that person was of the Roman Catholic faith.

That action,

in and of itself, as far as Professor Black could

discover, does not amount to a crime.

But as he says,

such a policy

would.be a gross abuse of power that could seriously affect our
national unity.
This example, unlike the last one,

is not so extreme that

it's happening can be ruled out, and I think it is wrong to believe
that a president could not be removed for such behavior.
84
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I do not
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believe that this sort of bigotry practiced by a president is pro

tected by our Constitution, nor do I believe it was the Framers
intention to do so.

It is important to remember that an an overly
ti

»/

Strict interpretation of high crimes and misdemeanors can bring
about as much harm as can a general term such as maladministration.

Professor Black's third example is not. as "clear cut" as

his two previous ones, but he does nevertheless set forth a serious

question.

The question is asked, is it possible that military action

that has not been authorized by Congress and that has been concealed
from Congress might not "at some point constitute such a murderous
and insensate abuse of the commander-in-chief power as to amount to
O £-

a "high crime" or "misdemeanor" for impeachment purposes?"

Black

says that such an action, as far as he knows, is not criminal.
if it is not criminal I think it should be

Even

impeachable because it is

this sort of excrescence on the part of a president that could lead

this country down the roads of absolutism.
The three previous examples are not the sort of things that

will necessarily happen in the United States.

But the fact that they

are unlikely to happen does not mean they would not.

The examples

point out misconduct on the part of the president that is not nec

essarily criminal and thus I think they point out the invalidity
of the proposition that an impeachable offenses must be a crime.

It might be more clarifying to turn the coin around and
ask the question if a president should be impeached for reckless

driving.

That is a misdemeanor as far as I know, but is it a high

misdemeanor, and should it be impeachable?
85 Ibid., p. 35.

No, I would think not,
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but this does show the problem involved in determining what is a

high misdemeanor worthy of impeachment.

Another question, again

asked by professor Black, is, should a president be impeached if
he transported a woman across state lines for immoral purposes?

This poses a very difficult problem because it does break the law,

the Mann Act.

If this actually did happen the president would be

guilty of a crime, but is it a high crime and should he be impeached

for it?

Or better yet do you think this is the sort of thing the

Framers had in mind when they formulated the impeachment clause?

Again, my answer to this question must also be no.

Impeachment, it

seems to me, is a constitutional remedy, and its' use was not limited
to those offenses in the Constitution or statute books but rather

was aimed at serious misconduct that is injurious and abusive to

our constitutional institutions and our form of government regardless
of what the law has to say.
IV.

Conclusion

Impeachment is potentially the most powerful weapon in the

Congressional arsenal and for that reason the least used.

Only

once has a president ever been impeached, and it is a shaky precedent

at best.

Never has a definite meaning been given to the impeachment

language of high crimes and misdemeanors, and this accounts for the

battles that have been fought and will continue to be fought over
the meaning of that phrase.

A finite list of the offenses included

within the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" probably will never
occur.

And to make a finite list would not be in the best interest

of our country.

That phrase has never been strictly defined because

of the nature of the phrase.

The phrase includes not only statutory

and constitutional offenses, but also all those ingenious sorts of
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offenses that are abusive to our constitutional system or government,

but are not defined as crimes.

The reason they are not defined as

crimes is because it was recognized that the ingenuity of an evil
office holder,

in this case the President, could perpetrate some

harmful act that our legilature had not foreseen.

The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" may mean to some
that an indictable offense is required.
taken assumption,

This, however,

is a-mis

because to do so one would have to remove that

phrase from the context in which it was adopted and apply to it a

present day criminal meaning.
to make.

This is a tempting and easy mistake

However, as I have shown impeachment was not an invention

of the Framers of our Constitution.

Instead our impeachment mechanism

was adopted from that of England's.

Impeachment itself was conceived of in England because the

objects of that process were, for one reason or another, beyond the
reach or ordinary criminal redress.

The phrase "high crimes and

misdemeanors" was first met, not in the criminal law of England
but in the impeachment of the Earl of Suffolk in 1386.

In fact

when that phrase was first met there was no such crime as a misde

meanor in England.

Lesser crimes were, at that time, prosecuted as

trespasses, and it was not until about one hundred and fifty years
later that trespasses were supplanted by the term misdemeanor as a
category of ordinary crimes.

There was also a functional difference

between "high misdemeanor" as used by the English Parliament and

"misdemeanor" as it was used in the criminal law.

High crimes and

misdemeanors established a category of political offenses against

the state whereas "misdemeanor" in the criminal law described a private
wrong.

Thus while "misdemeanor" did enter the ordinary-criminal law
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it was not the criterion of "high misdemeanor" in the Parliamentary

law of impeachment and likewise neither did "high misdemeanors" find
their way into the general criminal law of England.

High crimes

end misdemeanors, are then, words of art confined to impeachment with
no relation to the ordinary criminal law. .And one only has to look

at the impeachments in England to see that they did not necessarily
have to lie for a crime.

The only requirement was that they must in

some way subvert or undermine the fundamental principles of English
government.

This, then, was the history of "high crimes and misdemeanors"
when the Framers sat down in Philadelphia to carve out our Constitu

tion.

The Framers were intelligent men and in light of their task

did a very good job.

They provided us with a living constitution,

not one that was meant to last for a few months or years but for
many years.

More than half of the signers of our Constitution were law

yers and of them almost half received their legal educations in
England.

Then, as today, it was acknowledged that our model of

impeachment was borrowed from England.

In the Constitutional Con

vention George Mason referred to Hasting's impeachment voicing con
cern that his misconduct some of which was not criminal, was not

impeachable as our Constitution was then worded.

So in addition to

Treason and Bribery Mason added "high crimes and misdemeanors" thus
implying that it should reach the misconduct he was concerned about.

Nothing in the debates that took place then or prior, to September 8
indicates that the
crimes.

Framers limited that phrase to include only

In fact the language used in the debate concerning impeach

ment was not limited to criminality but instead implied that impeachment
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could lie for.less than a crime.

Other contemporary remarks also indicate that impeachment

may lie for less than a crime, like the one made by James Iredell
in the North Carolina ratification convention.

There he said in

talking of impeachment:

. . . , the person convicted is further liable to a
trial at common law, and may receive such common law pun
ishment as belongs to a description of such offences if it

be punishable by that law.86
In that quote he almost spells out the fact that an impeachable
offense may or may not lie for a crime when he said "if it be pun
ishable by that law"

.

James Madison, the person who objected to

maladministration as being to vague in the September 8 debate in
the Convention, said in the Virginia ratification convention that

a president, could be impeached if he summoned only a. few states to

sign a treaty because a majority of the states would be affected by
his misdemeanor.

That act which Madison called a misdemeanor was

not a crime under statutes at that time,

"Other, post convention remarks include one made by Alex
ander Hamilton.

He wrote at that time that:

"Man,

in public trust,

will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of

being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him ob88

noxious to legal punishment."
Thus,

over and over again one is faced with the number of

examples in which the Framers, and others,
86

speak of impeachment in

Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, Constitutional Grounds
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less than criminal terms.

I believe then that the Framers never

intended to limit impeachment to indictable crimes, and they im
plied this many times.

It has also been shown that the language used in the Con

stitution does not limit impeachment to crimes.

There is nothing

magical about the terms used in connection with impeachment that

limit impeachable offenses to crimes.

make impeachment a criminal process.

Neither does the language used

If impeachment is a criminal

process and removal a punishment, a number of constitutional problems
are raised namely that a subsequent trial and punishment would vio
late the double jeopardy provision.

If impeachment is seen as a

political process and a political remedy, as I believe the Framers
did, then no problems arise.

The no superfluous language doctrine

also requires that misdemeanors be given a less than criminal con
tent.

The fact there is no federal common law and that "high

crimes and misdemeanors"

is a term of art also requires that we turn

to the English meaning of that term to give it content unless it is
otherwise limited.

The term is not limited and thus its meaning as

understood in England was accepted.

And the term "high crimes and

misdemeanors" was not limited to crimes in that country.

Impeachment was not limited to the criminal law sorts of
crimes because the two serve different purposes.

impeachment is not to punish but to remedy.
ishes, but,

The purpose of

The criminal law pun

the primary function of impeachment is to maintain con

stitutional government.

The Constitution exempts impeachment from

a criminal law function by providing that a subsequent trial may
take place.

The criminal law should not be a limit upon impeachment

55

•because it sets general standards of conduct that everyone must
follow, and does not address itself to abuses of presidential
power.

Again, impeachment was invented to reach those officials

beyond the ordinary criminal redress.

Thus a president, in an im

peachment proceeding, is made to answer for abusing only those powers
that he possesses.

As I said earlier, to limit impeachable offenses to only
those that are indictable may set a standard so restrictive that

many offenses that could adversely affect our government could not

be reached.

impeachable.

This does not mean that all presidential misconduct is

His misconduct must have a substantial affect upon

. our constitutional system or government.

In determining the sub

stantiality, the facts must NOT be considered in terms of isolated
or separate events but must be considered as a whole in the context
of the office of the President.

In exercising its authority I do not believe the House of

Representatives needs to prove every article of impeachment beyond
a reasonable doubt before requiring the President to stand trial in

the Senate.

If proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, was the constitu

tional standard, the Senate trial would be a redundant re-enactment
of the proceedings in the House.

ere easily distinguishable.

The function of the two chambers

The House,' analogous to a grand jury,

decides whether there Is enough evidence to justify holding a trial.
If so, the House draws up articles of impeachment and then acts as
prosecutor in presenting the evidence to the Senate which renders
a judgment.

Any impeachment case will probably have its ambiguities
and weaknesses, and they should be explored and tested in a full
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adversary procedure of a trial before the Senate.

It is not up to

the House to hold a trial, for the purposes of the House, I believe,

there need only be a showing of reasonable grounds to believe that
serious misconduct has occurred.

It is for the Senate after a trial

to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to convict.

The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors,"•as Berger states,

may not be as sharply defined as "treason" or "bribery" but it does
have an ascertainable content in English practice.

Thus, even though

the phrase leaves more latitude for judgment to the Senate, which is
the nature of the phrase, this is not equivalent to unbridled discretion.
The Framer's last intention was to leave the Senate free to declare

any conduct whatsoever a "high crime and misdemeanor."

Maladmini

stration was objected to because of its vagueness, and "high crimes
and misdemeanors" was adopted in its place with knowledge that it was
a term'of art with a^ technical meaning, a "meaning sought by recurrence

to English practice."
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The offenses included within the meaning of"

"high crimes and misdemeanors", as mentioned before, includes such
acts as, abuse of official power,

trayal of trust, and others.

neglect of duty,

corruption, be

Congress has no more right to go beyond

these established boundries than they do to extend the boundries of

"treason" or bribery".

"It was never intended that Congress should

be the final judge of the boundries of its own powers."
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"Limits
91

on Congress determined by Congress itself would be no limits at all."
Berger reminds us that "impeachment was a carefully limited exception
89

^Berger, Impeachment, p. 107.

9°Ibid., p. 116.
9libld.. p. 118.
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to the separation of powers, tolerable only if exercised strictly
92
within bounds."

To a degree the Senate must be trusted to exercise self-re
straint in the exercise of its impeachmnt power.

But when Congress

goes beyond its Constitutional limits those limits "are subject to

judicial enforcement" and as Berger states,

"judicial review of im

peachments is required to protect the other branches from Congress -

arbitrary will."
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Our Constitution,

said the Supreme Court condemns

"all arbitrary exercise of power " and as Berger states "the solepower to try" affords no more exemption from that doctrine than does
the sole power to legislate, which,

extend to arbitrary acts"."^

it needs no citation, does not

Also it has been epitomized by the

Court that the due process clause acts in "protection against the
o<

individual against arbitrary action." ^

When one enters government

service he "does not cease to be a "person" within the Fifth Amendment;
end an impeachment for offenses outside constitutional authorization

would deny him the protection afforded by due process."
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That the

due process guarantee applies ijs proven by the statement made in the

book Impeachment by the House Judiciary Committee.

There it was said

in the examination of witnesses and the presentation of testimony, the
general rules of evidence obtainable in criminal courts apply, including
the constitutional presumptions and guarantees applicable to criminal
92

y Ibid.

93T
Ibid..

p.

119.

Ibid.,

p.

120.

oil
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Ibid.
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trials."7(

Thus the foregoing points and guarantees will assure that

Congress respect the Constitutional boundries that limit them. .
Impeachment is a grave step for our nation and should be

resorted to only when the President exhibits conduct seriously
incompatible with our Constitution or the. principles behind our
Constitution or government.

In concluding this paper the author

leaves the reader with this statement;

In sum, to limit impeachable conduct to criminal of

fenses would be incompatible with the evidence concerning
the constitutional meaning of the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" and would frustrate the purpose that the
framers intended for impeachment. State and federal crimi
nal laws are not written in order to preserve the nation
against serious abuse of the presidential office. But this
if the purpose of the Constitutional provision for the im

peachment of a President and that purpose gives meaning to
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors."y°
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Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment, p. 700.
Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, Constitutional Grounds

for Presidential Impeachment, p. 25.
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APPENDIX A

The following discussion is that which occurred on July 20,

1787.

The discussion centered around the provision which stated

that the President was to be removable on impeachment and conviction
of mal-practice or neglect of duty.

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Gouveneur Morris- moved to strike out

this part of the resolution.

Mr. P. observed (ought not to) be

impeached whilst in office.

•Mr. Davie.

If he be not impeachable whilst in office he

will spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected.
He considered this as essential security for the good behavior of
the Executive.-

•Mr. Wilson concurred in the necessity of making the Executive
impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. Govr. Morris.

He can do no criminal act without co

adjutors who may be punished.

In case he should be reelected, that

will be sufficient proof of his innocence.

Besides who is to impeach?

Is the impeachment to suspend -his functions?
chief will go on.

If it is not, the mis

If it is, the impeachment will be nearly equiva

lent to a displacement and will render the Executive dependent on
those who are to impeach.

Colonel Mason.

No point is of more importance than that the

right of impeachment should be continued.

justice?

Shall any man be above

Above all shall t.hat man be above it, who can commit the

most extensive injustice?

When great crimes were committed he was

for punishing the principal as well as the coadjutors.

There had

been much d.ebate and difficulty as to the mode of choosing the Ex
ecutive.

He approved of that which had been adopted at first,
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namely that of referring the appointment to the National Legislature.
One objection against electors was the danger of their being corrupted

by the candidates:

and this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of

impeachments whilst in office.

Shall the man who has practiced

corruption and by that means procured his appointment in the first

instance, be suffered to escape punishment by repeating his guilt?
Doer. Fanklin was for retaining the clause as favorable to

the Executive.

History furnishes one example only of a first

Magistrate being formally brought to public justice.
out against this as being unconstitutional.

Everybody cried

What was the practice

before this in cases where the Chief Magistrate rendered himself

obnoxious?

Why recourse was had to assassination in which he was

not only deprived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating
his character.

It would be the best way therefore to provide in the

Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive when his
misconduct should deserve it and for his honorable acquittal when
he should be unjustly accused.
Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption and some few other

offences to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the
cases ought to be enumerated and defined.
Mr. (Madison) thought it indispensable that some provision
should be made for defending the community against the incapacity,

negligence or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate.

The limitation of

the period of his service, -was not a sufficient security.

He might

pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation- or oppression.

He might betray his trust to foreign powers.

The case of Executive

Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the legislative
or of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration.
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It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members

of an assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging or
be bribed to betray their trust.

Besides the restraints of their

personal integrity and honor, the difficulty in acting in concert
for purposes of corruption was a security to the public.

_

And if

one or a few members only should be seduced, .the soundness of the

remaining members would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the
body.

In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be ad

ministered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more

within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be
fatal to the Republic,

Mr. Pinckney did not see the necessity of impeachments.
He was sure they ought not to issue from the Legislature who
would in that case hold them as a rod over the Executive and by that

means effectually destroy his independence.

His revisionary power

in particular would be rendered altogether insignificant.
Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments.

magistrate will not fear them.of them,

A good

A bad one ought to be kept in fear

fle hoped the maxim would never be adopted here that the

Chief Magistrate could do (no) wrong.
Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme

caution in favor of Liberty might enervate the Government we were

forming.

He wished the House to recur to the primatlve axiom that

the three great departments.should be separate and independent:
the Executive should be so equally with the Judiciary.
be the case if the Executive should be impeachable?

said that the Judiciary would be Impeachable.

That

Would this

It had been

But it should have

been remembered at the same time that the Judiciary should hold
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their places, not for a limited time but during good behavior.

It

is necessary, therefore, that a forum should be established for

trying misbehavior.

The Executive was to hold his place for a limited

term like the members of the Legislature.

Like them particularly the

Senate whose members would continue in appointment the same term for

six years.

He would periodically be tried for his misbehavior by

his electors, who would continue or discontinue him in trust accord

ing to the manner in which he had discharged it.

Like them, there

fore, he ought to be subject to no intermediate trial, by impeachment.
he ought not to be impeachable unless he hold his office during good
behavior, a tenure which would be most agreeable to him; provided an

independent and effectual forum could be devised.

But under no cir

cumstances ought he to be impeachable by the Legislature.

This would

be destructive to his independence and the principles of the Constitu
tion.

He relied on the vigor of the Executive as a great security

for the public liberties.

-Mr. Randolph.

principle with him.

The propriety of Impeachments was a favorite

Guilt whenever found out to'be punished.

The

executive will have great opportunities of abusing his power; particu

larly in time of war when the military force and in some respects the

public money will be in his hands.

Should no regular punishment be

provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults and Insurrec
tions.

He is aware of the necessity of proceeding with a cautious

hand, and of excluding as much as possible the influence of the

Legislature from the business.

He suggested for consideration an

idea which had fallen (from Colonel Hamilton) of composing a forum

out of the Judges belonging to the States:

and even of requiring

some preliminary inquest whether just grounds of impeachment existed.
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Doctor Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange

during the late war.

An agreement was made between France and

Holland; by which their two fleets were to unite at a certain time.
and place.

The Dutch fleet did not appear.

wonder at it.

Everybody began to

At length it was suspected that the statholder was

at the bottom of the matter.

The suspicion prevailed more and more.

Yet as he could not be impeached and no regular examination took

place, he remained in his office, and strengthening his own party,

as the party opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth to the
most violent animosities and contentions.

Had he been impeachable,,

a regular and peaceable inquiry would have taken place and he would
if guilty have been duly punished, if innocent restored to the con
fidence of the public.

Mr. King remarked that the case of the statholder was not

applicable.
elected.

He held his place for life, and was not periodically

In the former case impeachments are proper to secure good

behavior.

Invthe latter they are unnecessary; the periodical

re

sponsibility to the electors being an equivalent security . . .
Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had now been changed by the argu
ments used in the discussion.

He was now sensible of the necessity

of impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any time in
office.

Our Executive was not like a magistrate having a life interest,

much less'like one having an hereditary interest in his office?

He

may be bribed by a greater .interest to betray his trust; and danger
of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to
guard against it by displacing him.

England well secured against bribery.

in the whole Kingdom.

One would think the King of

He has as it were a fee simple

Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV,

The

6k

Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery; corrupt

ing his electors, and incapacity were other causes of impeachment.
For the latter he should be punished not as a man, but as an officer,

and punished.only be degradation from his office.
is not the King but the prime Minister.

This Magistrate

The people are the King.

When we make him* ameanable to justice, however, we should take

care to provide some mode that will not make him dependent on the
9<?

Legislature.

99 Simpson,
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